Going Around In Circles

Let's not start that again...

As of late there has been a heated debate among the community that various forms of standards and compliance are effective/ineffective at actually securing systems and networks. Just a quick note:

First post I read today is from Ascension Risk Management. There was a point/counterpoint that was detailed that, suffice to say, leaned towards the fact that standards and compliance are not effective. In order for something resembling standards to be effective, it must be made too narrow or not actionable. This is a good argument, but it doesn't tell the whole story.

The next blog post I read is from Emergent Chaos. This post was about the fact that after Former/embattled/kind-of/not Senator Norm Coleman's campaign's infrastructure was broken into, and there may possibly have been a breach, donors found out via Wikileaks, rather than the campaign. One quote sticks out:
We need public, documented and debated standards of how such decisions should be made. With such standards, organizations could better make decisions about risk. Additionaly, both regulators and the public could be more comfortable that those piping up about risk were not allowing the payers to call the tune.
So within the same day, there is one school saying that standards are ineffective and there is another stating that we need more standards in order to shuffle through the varied methods people use in regards to security related tasks. What a vicious circle.

I am on the fence. I think that without standards, there are a good amount of small and medium sized businesses that would have no security or extremely lax security. Standards do help to push these organizations into doing more to protect data. On the other hand, with a competent security practitioner, these standards are simply "fill in the box" tests that people adhere to. That security practitioner is likely doing things to secure the infrastructure more than the standard accounts for.

I think standards are simply not scalable. If there must be policy, it should reflect the end result, not the means. It is better to say "you are liable for any breach that occurs" than "you are not allowed to have SSLv2 on your hosts". In this way, it should create an incentive to have network owners and operators think about how to go about security. If there's a breach, they are liable, after all.
Posted on 5:09 PM by Tim Cronin and filed under | 1 Comments »

1 comments:

Adam said... @ May 4, 2009 at 10:06 PM

Hi Tim,

I wasn't calling for broad, generic standards, as much as a debate around when it's ok to say "there's no evidence that the data was abused." What should we, as a profession, expect someone has done when they make such a statement?

To your broader question, I think we need data, not debates about who thinks what.